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Maxi Schoeman 
 
China and Africa: whose challenge and whose oppor-
tunity? 
 
 
cholarly contributions on China’s rise as an ‘incipient superpower’ tend 
to focus on its economic ‘giantism’, its modernising security establish-
ment, its energy policies and needs and, to some extent, its impact on the 
global natural environment in an age of climate change and environmental 
degradation. John Mearsheimer (2006) analysed China's rise, and its con-
comitant impact on the international system, on the basis of hegemony, de-
fining the country’s rise as ‘unpeaceful’1 due to the potential for an ‘intense 
security competition’ with the US that might result in ‘considerable potential 
for war’. When it comes to China's relations with Africa, international views, 
especially in the United States, whether scholarly or journalistic, seem to re-
gard China as a ‘bad influence’, potentially undermining ‘years of interna-
tional efforts to link aid to better governance’, and as a prop for ‘dangerous 
regimes, producing a new cycle of unsustainable debt, and damaging anti-
poverty efforts across the region’ (Chan 2007; see also Klare and Volman 2006). 
Often, also, the impression is created of an ‘either/or’ situation – that Africa’s 
growing relations with China are a sign of a move away from its traditional 
trading partners (Europe and the US) and that Africa ‘privileges’ relations 
with China on ideological and political grounds.  
Increasingly, though, this negative view is being challenged by more 
nuanced analyses of the relationship between China and Africa (see e.g. Al-
den 2007; Kohnert 2008). One obvious problem that commentators and ana-
lysts are confronted with, is that of ‘what is Africa?’ – i.e. the tendency to 
treat Africa as a single unit or country, in other words the tendency to over-
simplify. The relationship between China and ‘Africa’ is not a bilateral rela-
tionship, but a series of bilateral relations between China and more than 40 
countries on the African continent. At the same time, it could be argued that 
there is scope for generalising about Africa, provided that the analyst allows 
for differentiation and the fact that the nature of these relations might vary 
from country to country. So, for instance, Zafar (2007) distinguishes between 
groups of countries in Africa on the basis of the economic impact of their re-
lations with China: winners, mixed and losers.  
                                            
1  Mearsheimer’s choice of the word ‘unpeaceful’ probably stemmed from Zheng’s article 
(2005) in Foreign Affairs, ‘China’s “Peaceful Rise” to Great Power Status’. 
S 
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This contribution focuses on relations between China and Africa in general, 
arguing that  
a) although there is a marked difference in the nature of these relations, 
and Africa’s relations with the EU2 (and the West), this is not an ‘either/or’ 
situation either economically or politically,  
b) that China’s involvement on the continent might just provide the ‘big 
push’ needed to propel Africa onto a path of sustainable development and  
c) that Africa’s growing ties with China pose challenges and opportunities 
to all three regions: Africa, China and Europe.  
It should be kept in mind, though, that the current international financial cri-
sis hovers somewhere in the background of whatever scholars and analysts 
have to say, and writing in November 2008, it is difficult to estimate what 
changes can be expected in relations between China and Africa in the face of 
global economic recession. 
The reaction of Europe to relations between China and Africa 
Europe’s concerns seem to be: 
– the possible negative impact of Chinese economic, political, social and en-
vironmental exploitation in African countries (see Chari and Corbridge 
2008: 477); 
– an implied concern that China’s growing relationship with Africa might un-
dermine European/Western influence and economic benefits and ties and 
– a concern that China, as a rising superpower, together with other emerg-
ing powers in the South, might not only be a ‘free-rider’ in the interna-
tional system, but might actually change the underlying value structure 
of the world order. 
Europe (like the United States: see Zoellick 2005) therefore urges the Chinese 
to organise its cooperation with Africa along the lines of ‘good international 
citizenship’. Politicians are careful not to criticise China’s involvement in Af-
rica, but attempt to create or emphasise a ‘bond’ between China and Europe 
and encourage cooperation in African development. In a press interview in 
2007, EU commissioner Louis Michel commented as follows on the EU’s 
view of Chinese involvement in Africa: 
I think that our partner states will always find in us … a preferred devel-
opment partner. So I am not scared of … competition … we have to try to 
attract China and its development policies to bring them closer to our con-
cepts and to what is best for developing countries.3 
                                            
2  There is, of course, also an increasing tendency to treat the EU as ‘a single country’. 
3  Much the same view was expressed by Javier Solana (2007). 
China and Africa 
 
405
As mentioned, Europe’s approach to China, especially with regard to Africa, 
is less cloaked in strategic terms, more in terms of a concern that China’s in-
volvement with Africa will result in exploitation, the destruction of productive 
capacity and employment opportunities (especially with regard to light manu-
factures such as textiles), the undermining of good governance and a refusal to 
become involved with the promotion of regional security etc. Another often 
expressed fear is that this relationship will further breed corruption. A more 
recent concern is that of Chinese immigration to Africa and the fact that sup-
posedly large numbers of Chinese workers will push out local labour.  
For Europe, in short, the concern is that China will exacerbate and pro-
long various socio-economic and governance crises on the continent, undo-
ing the EU approach to addressing these crises. The European perception of 
China’s impact on Africa is well summarised by Berger (2007:3):  
The baseline of China’s non-interference policy, combined with a neo-
liberal, one-size fits-all economically based foreign policy approach, has 
earned China a reputation as a neo-colonial powerhouse. China has re-
peated European post-colonial strategies of asserting influence and shack-
ling countries into dependency. 
The question is, of course, whether this perception of China – that it spells 
danger, if not disaster for the continent – is based on reality. But it is also 
worth looking at how Europe’s relationship with Africa is constructed – Eu-
ropean development assistance very often conceals the ‘message’ that Africa is 
a problem. Therefore, aid and development are necessary in order to secure 
Europe (and the West), migration should be controlled and prevented and 
failed and failing states propped up in order to prevent them from becoming 
havens for terrorists. In short, Africa is viewed as a problem to be solved and 
a place in need of being ‘saved’. In this sense there is a huge difference be-
tween the Chinese perception of its relations with Africa (that of an opportu-
nity) and that of Europe (Africa as a continent that poses a ‘problem’). A sec-
ond question that is raised by European concern about Chinese -African rela-
tions, is whether this concern is genuinely about the ‘shackling’ of the conti-
nent into dependency or whether European concern also harbours a fear that 
its access to markets and resources might be threatened. Kohnert (2008: 15) 
questions the altruism of the European approach, and implicitly cautions a-
gainst treating the EU as a single entity – he points to complaints by Euro-
pean Commission officials that countries such as France, Spain, Italy and 
Portugal might revert to economic nationalism in their attempts to protect 
their economies against Chinese competition in Africa. The following sec-
tions will deal with these questions. 
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The nature of Chinese-African relations 
China’s relations with Africa – its approach to the continent – are usually 
discussed in terms of its need for natural resources for its growing domestic 
industrialisation and manufacturing demands, and its concomitant need for 
external markets, In descriptions of its economic ties with Africa, its import 
needs are usually emphasised, especially with regard to oil and minerals – the 
two commodities, together with timber, that Africa can provide in abundance.  
According to the World Bank (Foster et al 2008), China’s natural re-
source imports from Sub-Sahara Africa reached US$22bn in 2006, with petro-
leum accounting for about 80 %. China depends on Africa for 30 % of its oil 
imports, 80 % of its cobalt and 40 % of its manganese imports, with Angola 
its largest partner. 40% of Africa’s oil production exports go to the US, 15 % 
to Europe and 16 % to China. The point is, of course, that China’s trade with 
Africa is growing, albeit it from a low base. China accounts for 19 % of Sub-
Sahara Africa’s exports, up from less than 10 % in 2000, but considerably lo-
wer than Sub-Sahara Africa’s exports to the US and EU (the latter accounted 
for approximately 43 % in 2000 and 40% in 2006). What is obvious here is that 
the EU’s share of Sub-Sahara African exports is declining relative to that of 
China. Interestingly, taken as a whole Sub-Sahara Africa still has a positive 
though small trade balance with China, US$28.8bn exports to China and 
US$26.7 imports from China in 2006. How long this will last, is uncertain. This 
surplus favours natural resource exporting countries so several African 
countries show a negative trade balance.  
Thus, for instance, South Africa is increasingly concerned about the struc-
ture of its trade with China: China recently surpassed Germany as South Af-
rica’s largest import market, and South Africa accounts for about 25 % of 
China’s African trade, with South Africa exporting goods to China to the va-
lue of US$2.2b and importing goods to the value of US$7b. Apart from the 
trade balance in favour of China, there is apprehension about the nature of 
the products traded. According to South Africa’s deputy minister of trade 
and industry, Rob Davies (2008:1), ‘... the content of trade approximates a ty-
pical colonial relationship …’. 
Although much attention is paid to Chinese exports of ‘cheap’ products 
to Sub-Sahara Africa flooding markets, ruining employment opportunities etc., 
one should also take notice of the fact that a sizeable portion of Sub-Sahara Af-
rican imports from China are in light machinery and transport equipment – 
almost one third of imports from China. This indeed could be part of the ‘real’ 
concern of EU countries. France has already complained of trade diversion and 
this is an important aspect for future research: what exactly is happening in 
terms of expanding trade between China and Africa – is it trade diversion or 
trade creation? South Africa’s change in import direction from Germany to 
China (mentioned above), might suggest trade diversion, but a more general 
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view of African natural resource exports, shows a more nuanced picture: 
Goldstein et al. (2008: 35) point out that 80 % of China’s manufacturing ex-
ports are produced by multinational corporations and that China’s ‘high de-
mand for raw materials partially reflects relocation of raw material demand 
from production sites elsewhere.’ In other words, the origin of trade diver-
sion to some extent lies ‘elsewhere’. 
As to fears caused by the influx of Chinese migrants and their pushing Afri-
can labour out of markets, one could caution against confusing possible xeno-
phobic tendencies with resentment against Chinese migrants per se. In South Af-
rica, for example, xenophobic attacks in May 2008 were directed against for-
eigners from other African countries, and specifically against Somali refugees 
accused of ‘stealing local people’s work’ (Joubert 2008). In other words, per-
haps poor people in poor countries will view all foreigners with suspicion 
and will perceive their success as threats. It is therefore not necessarily Chi-
nese migrants who pose threats to local employment and business opportu-
nities and this is a topic that needs much more investigation before one can 
draw the conclusion that Chinese migrants are a threat. Another allegation 
concerns the undermining of the textile industries of various African coun-
tries, with South Africa and the DRC often cited as examples. Again, such al-
legations should be treated with caution. The closing of the DRC’s biggest 
textile factory in 2006 was in no small way brought about by exports from 
China to the DRC by Congolese exporters now living in China. And, after 
South Africa had reached agreement with Chinese textile and clothing ex-
porters in 2006 to curtail such exports to the South African markets, these 
‘gaps’ were filled by other Asian exporters and the Chinese-South African 
agreement therefore brought no relief.  
There is, though, another aspect of China’s economic relations with Af-
rica that is crucial in the debate about its impact on Africa, and it is one sel-
dom referred to or analysed (with the exception of a new World Bank Report 
of July 2008 by Foster et al). This is the area of infrastructure financing for 
Sub-Sahara Africa. One of the biggest problems standing in the way of Afri-
can development is its lack of standard indicators of infrastructure develop-
ment. Over time it has become increasingly difficult for Sub-Sahara Africa to 
attract finance for infrastructure – a product of the tendency of international 
investment to seek quick profits and high returns on investment. Yet, infra-
structure development has become the one area in which China is increas-
ingly involved, and it is from this contribution that the World Bank report on 
‘Building Bridges’ (Foster et al 2008) takes its name. China’s biggest invest-
ments are in hydropower generation (once the current initiatives are com-
pleted, it will have increased access to electricity by 30 %) and transport, es-
pecially railways, with investment having increased fourfold between 2001 
and 2005.  
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The biggest recipients of infrastructure finance are Nigeria, Angola, Su-
dan and Ethiopia, but a total of 35 countries have benefited from such deals 
or are currently discussing funding opportunities with the Chinese. A large 
share of this investment goes to general multi-sector infrastructure projects 
allocated in accordance with government priorities. As is rather typical in 
developing country co-operation practices, the state is seen to have a central 
role, and developing countries have never been much taken with the idea of 
the privatisation of basic needs provision in the infrastructure sector. In fact, 
in some instances, such as water provision an Mozambique, their experiences 
have been decidedly negative and go some way to explaining why the Chi-
nese model is so popular.4  
When one turns to China’s political relationship with Africa, the fears are, 
as mentioned, that China will not be a responsible global player and that its 
principle of non-interference will encourage/reinforce bad governance on the 
continent, and Angola, Zimbabwe and Sudan are often mentioned as examples. 
Yet, here it would seem that things are changing:  
– Over the past year at least, China has become increasingly critical of Sudan 
and Zimbabwe, putting pressure on Sudan to accept the hybrid UN-AU 
peacekeeping force in that country (see e.g. Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small 
2008; Meidan 2006). China also did not, as is often portrayed in the me-
dia, veto Security Council resolutions criticising Sudan, but abstained 
from voting. As to Zimbabwe, China exerted pressure on Mugabe and 
his ZANU/PF party shortly before the start of the 2008 Olympics to ne-
gotiate with the MDC in compliance with SADC and AU decisions, 
thereby making it possible for former president Mbeki to broker a deal 
(Evans, 2008; see also China-Africa Strategic Business Review 2008:3). 
– China is increasingly participating in UN peacekeeping missions and at 
present has the second highest number of P5 peacekeepers in the field. 
The above might point to a change in China’s foreign policy practice, though 
it is not necessarily indicative of a change in its underlying foreign policy va-
lues. Its pressure on Sudan could be related to or explained in terms of its 
dependence on Sudanese oil and the security of its investments in that coun-
try, as could perhaps be the case for Zimbabwe. The fact of the matter is that 
such pressure conforms both with the general international need for stability 
and peace in order to safeguard the international system and, of course, the 
desire to protect national interests.  
                                            
4  Neither, incidentally, is it only China that invests in Africa – African investment in China 
is growing, especially coming from Mauritius (Broadman, 2007) and South Africa (Schoe-
man 2007; Wang 2007). 
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Opportunities and challenges for Europe, China and Africa 
The current and growing international economic crisis, which is much more 
than a financial meltdown, might prove to be the biggest political and eco-
nomic crisis faced by the West in the post Second World War period. The 
Anglo-Saxon capitalist model (savings-deficient, consumption-oriented, gov-
ernment deficit-burdened), is under serious threat and has already produced 
a casualty in Iceland, with the Euro-zone in ‘official’ recession since mid-
November 2008. This model, which basically supported American consump-
tion, will not remain intact. The question is; what will take its place and what 
role will China and its economy play? Further, what are the international po-
litical implications of the crisis for the future? Developing countries, like tho-
se in Sub-Sahara Africa, will also feel the impact of this crisis, but this time 
round their natural resource-based economies will not necessarily suffer as 
much as they did in the 1970s and 1980s. Partly this is because their economic 
dependency on the West has been lessened and their ties to the emerging eco-
nomies of the Gulf and South and East Asia are stronger (see e.g. The Eco-
nomist 11.10.2008:35-37).  
The challenge for Europe will probably be that its relative economic and 
political power vis-à-vis Africa will weaken and this may lead to Europe seri-
ously considering the actual fairness of relations with Africa, something that 
has not been Europe’s strong point up to now. Europe’s image of Africa is 
dismal – refugees , starving children, passive victims, disease, violent anar-
chy and state failure. Europe now has to confront its own degree of complic-
ity in this sorry state of affairs and grab the opportunity to address some of 
these problems it helped to create and sustain. Some of these problems con-
cern the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) and their disruption of 
regional integration. They sow division within regional trade blocs (see Gibb 
2008:1) although they supposedly encourage regional integration for eco-
nomic growth and development (see Lisbon Declaration 09.12.2007). Unfair 
trade practices continue through CAP, the EU’s fisheries policies and cotton 
subsidies, the latter of which result annually in a 35% loss of income for cot-
ton farmers in West and Central Africa. 
Until Europe reconsiders its divide-and-rule policies (EPA negotiations), 
and puts into practice its own calls for open markets and trade liberalisation, 
the Chinese style of engagement, much more based on economic comple-
mentarities and what is perceived to be a policy of development and coop-
eration (not European style development cooperation), and mutual solidarity 
and respect, will continue to attract and benefit Africa (see also Wade 2008). 
 China’s, major challenge would be to prove that it is a responsible in-
ternational citizen, not intent only on self-interest. Cynics would ask why 
China needs to prove this if its Western counterparts do not stick to these 
principles. Yet, China’s increasing involvement poses one all encompassing 
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challenge to this rising superpower: to decide what its role will be in the in-
ternational order and, crucially, to what extent it will remain a ‘global South 
partner’ rather than a member of the West’s ‘old boys club’. In this regard 
China might do well to retain an independent stance vis-à-vis Africa and not 
to succumb to European calls for a ‘trilateral relationship’ between the EU, 
Africa and China. 
A second challenge is to deal with Africa’s political expectations of Chi-
na as a developing global superpower. In many ways China’s ‘attraction’ for 
Africa lies in its shared history of colonialism, imperialism and exploitation 
at the hands of the West and, importantly, in China’s attitude to Africa – one 
which recognizes that Africa is not a ‘sick continent’ but an underdeveloped 
continent, and that it is not only a place of hardship and deprivation, but one 
which is desperate for opportunities to develop its potential (see King 2006).  
A third challenge is for China to balance partnership and leadership – it 
could become a hegemon (in the Gramscian sense) – and decide what values 
it will spread, especially in the realms of politics, governance and the envi-
ronment? 
Finally, the opportunities and challenges facing African states when 
dealing with China have to be considered. The economic benefits are uneven, 
depending largely, but not solely, on factor endowment. For Africa, the main 
challenge will be, rather obviously, to manage its relations with China in a 
beneficial way, but, of course, here the problem is ‘whose benefit’? Will China’s 
non-interference style of engagement necessarily undermine human rights, 
democratization and good governance and entrench bad governance and 
promote and deepen rent-seeking and corruption? 
It might just be that China’s willingness of late to sanction pariah states 
(Sudan and Zimbabwe) might prevent benefits from accruing only to corrupt 
and other elites in African societies. Here China’s involvement in infrastruc-
ture development might turn out to be crucial. As it literally and physically 
opens up African geographical spaces, such openness might improve living 
standards and quality of life; Chinese-built (and donated) hospitals and 
schools might do the same, and in this way, economic growth might turn in-
to economic development, and in turn, as was the case in Europe’s develop-
ment trajectory, this might fuel political liberalisation. So the challenge of 
China’s non-interventionist foreign policy, already undergoing some change, 
might turn into an opportunity for ordinary Africans. Let us remember a cur-
rent saying in some African states – ‘we cannot eat democracy’. 
A second challenge for Africa is for resource-rich countries to avert 
‘Dutch disease’ – to prevent their resource windfalls from undermining the 
economic diversification of their economies. As Botswana has shown, a rather 
narrow resource base is not necessarily an impediment to development – 
much, if not all, depends on economic policy for wealth distribution. Maybe 
this could be an opportunity for Europe to assist, through education aid (and 
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not just the use of ex-pats), with the training of policy experts in these coun-
tries. In other words, the challenge for Africa is how to deal wisely and effec-
tively with its new-found wealth resulting from an 80-90 % increase in trade 
for natural resource exporting countries. 
Another potential opportunity for African countries, especially those 
whose factor endowment strength lies not in natural resources, but in agri-
cultural production, for example, would be to foster food export opportuni-
ties to China. At this point it is Argentina, Canada and Australia who have 
strong comparative advantage in commodity production in agriculture, but 
several African countries have the potential to break into this market. Al-
though Mozambique is one example (rice, cattle ranches, poultry farming) 
(see China Business Frontier, August 2008), such possibilities also exist in other 
countries like Malawi and Tanzania. 
Yet the biggest opportunity for Africa in terms of its relations with Chi-
na, lies at the symbolic and political level; and this is the opportunity for ge-
nuine partnership as like-minded countries. This opportunity should not be 
under-estimated. Africa’s colonial history did not end when the continent 
gained independence, but continued in various forms of neo-colonialism, eco-
nomic and political exploitation and, at best, junior partnership with Europe. 
China’s rise is closely linked to, and even to an extent dependent on, contin-
ued access to African markets and political support in international forums. 
Both economically and politically the relationship is one of complementari-
ties, much more so than in the case of Africa-Europe relations. 
Conclusion 
Does the rise of China as an economic superpower and even as a potential 
political superpower, supported by and, at least to some extent dependent on 
relations with Africa, spell a changing world order in which economic and 
political power will gravitate towards the global South? And will China be-
come a new imperialist? China is not the only power investing in Africa, the 
Gulf states, India and other East Asian emerging markets are also doing so. 
And although all will be negatively impacted by the current global economic 
crisis, chances are that we will see a significant political shift of power, in-
creasingly favouring a re-invigorated global South. This trend in South-South 
cooperation might herald a new international system structure, hastened by 
the current crisis. China might no longer, in the words of one commentator, 
‘have the luxury of choosing the time of its succession’ (Business Day 
29.09.2008). Politically and economically, Africa might be a beneficiary of 
such a change in the international power structure. The ‘old world’ of Europe 
needs to think carefully about the implications of such a new ‘South world’, 
and how they view their position in it. 
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